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22 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Discussion with Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll,

Director of DIA

- 1. On 21 September 1965 I had a one hour discussion with General Carroll concerning COMOR's role in connection with the exploitation of photography. I explained the problem as I understood it and the views held in CIA concerning the need for COMOR to look into the problem of the exploitation of photography. General Carroll's position covered the following points:
  - a. He felt that since CIA and DIA held the main assets for the exploitation of satellite photography, those two agencies should make the decisions as to how the photography should be exploited. He felt that CIA and DIA were the two agencies generating requirements for detailed analysis and therefore the other agencies represented on COMOR had no real interest in the solution of the problem.
  - b. He agreed that if the burden of detailed reporting were to increase in the magnitude anticipated by NPIC, it would be necessary to make some fairly tough decisions concerning priority and scheduling of projects and the elimination of duplication. He felt, however, that this was the problem that would be attacked by the joint CIA-DIA survey to be conducted in response to the request from the Bureau of the Budget. He, therefore, felt that it would be unnecessary duplication for COMOR to concern itself with the problem at this time, although that as a result of the survey it might prove desirable to use COMOR in implementing whatever decisions were made as a result of the survey.
  - c. He felt that it was perfectly appropriate for COMOR to concern itself with the exploitation of photography in Phases I and II, but that in view of the lack of substantive expertise on the part of some COMOR representatives, it would be undesirable for COMOR to concern itself with Phase III reporting at this time.
- 2. I was unable to convince General Carroll that COMOR needed to begin to work with the problem as soon as possible in order to learn how to handle

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the procedural and other problems that were sure to emerge. I was unable to convince him that the efforts of COMOR and the joint CIA-DIA survey would be complementary rather than duplicative.  3. I told General Carroll that I would inform the Director and Mr. of his views and that one of us would be in touch with him again on the ma  Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  Copy 1 DDI 2 COMOR/DDS&T 3 D/NIPE 4 DDS&T 5 CGS/DDI 6 COMOR/DDS&T 7 COMOR/DDS&T 7 COMOR/DDS&T 8 COMOR/DDS&T
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